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Edwards v. Town of Ponchatoula2 4 the court made it unmistak-
ably clear that the tax exemption features available to new
industries by Section 22 of Article X of the State Constitution
are to be granted in strict compliance with the procedures therein
set forth and are not to be made the subject of barter and trade
as ordinary commodities of commerce. A corporation whose
original certificate of exemption issued by the State Board of
Commerce and Industry was about to expire contemplated ex-
pansion and approached the municipal authorities with the prop-
osition that, in return for the enactment of an ordinance con-
tracting the corporate limits in such a manner as to exclude its
properties therefrom, it would agree to expand its facilities, thus
affording additional employment opportunities, purchase certain
needed equipment for the city and make other payments and
improvements. Following a consideration of the proposal the
town council obliged by enacting the desired legislation and tax-
payers (including another corporation) sued to have the ordi-
nance set aside.
In his opinion Justice Fournet realistically reviews the facts,
concluding that the entire episode was a piece of taxation-gerry-
mandering and invalidated the ordinance as an attempted cir-
cumvention of the constitutional provision 25 requiring that pro-
posals for the creation or extension of such exemption be sub-
mitted to a vote of affected property taxpayers. The decision is
indeed commendable.
III. CIVIL CODE AND RELATED SUBJECTS
SUCCESSIONS, DONATIONS AND COMMUNITY PROPERTY
Harriet S. Daggett*
SUCCESSIONS
After a thorough and eminently fair survey of all the facts,
the court in Succession of David' found that the administrator,
though failing through ignorance to comply with many details
of legal procedure, had justly and honestly and attentively cared
for the involved estate. Furthermore, he had performed what the
court termed the "thankless task" with the consent and indeed,
at the earnest insistence of the heirs. Obviously, Article 1150,
24. 213 La. 116, 34 So. (2d) 394 (1948).
25. La. Const. of 1921, Art. X, § 22.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law School.
1. 213 La. 707, 35 So. (2d) 465 (1948).
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providing for penalties when the administrator fails to observe
certain laws of procedure in administration, should not have been
applied and in the sound discretion of the court was not applied.
Abundant authority for the decision is available.
In Pelican Well Tool & Supply Company, Incorporated v. Se-
bastian2 the plaintiff, creditor of deceased, was unable to prove
affirmatively a tacit, unconditional acceptance of the succession
and community by the daughter and widow and hence could not
hold them personally for the debt. Intentional acceptance of
property known to belong to the succession is necessary. Acts
of piety or humanity and conservatory acts do not constitute
acceptance.
In Lions v. Reine3 it was decided that the judge of the dis-
trict court had not abused his discretion by ordering a plantation
with equipment sold when a separate sale of the equipment,
movables, would have decreased the value and possibility of sale
of the land and the movables would not have brought enough to
settle debts, even though only a part of the land would have been
enough to balance the deficit.4
The Succession of Yeates5 was concerned with proof of a
sale, resulting in finding it to have been a donation in disguise
and null. It was ordered that the property be listed as part of
the mass of the succession. The allegation that the will of de-
ceased was void due to her lack of mental capacity was disproved
and it was decreed that the will be probated. A favored son was
to receive all of the disposable portion as an extra portion.
Article 1492 negated the contention that the will had been con-
fected under undue influence. Article 1533, prohibiting donation




The current issue of this journal contains a note discussing
the case of Atkins v. Johnston6 so a prolonged resum6 will not
be given here. The decision raises grave doubts regarding several
points. The tacit revocation of a gift is disapproved by the dis-
2. 212 La. 217, 31 So. (2d) 745 (1947).
3. 212 La. 559, 33 So. (2d) 113 (1947).
4. See Arts. 1165 and 1166, La. Civil Code of 1870.
5. 213 La. 541, 35 So. (2d) 210 (1948).
6. 213 La. 458, 35 So. (2d) 16 (1948), noted in (1949) 9 LOUISIANA LAW
REviow 294.
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senting justice. The possibility of attack by forced heirs of the
donor is denied by the majority opinion. If the donation is validly
revoked by consent of the parties and the property revested in
the estate of the donor, it may well be that his forced heirs would
have no cause to complain regarding their portions as the
donor's estate sustained no diminution by the gift. If it so hap-
pened that the original donee, consenting to the revocation, had
forced heirs, might they not complain that this voluntary relin-
quishment was a gift?
A wife made a donation to her husband in 1924. Five years,
thereafter she was interdicted. Her curator sought to be allowed
to revoke the donation in McIntyre v. Winnsboro State Bank &
Trust Company.7 The court declared that Act 187 of 1942, mak-
ing interspousal gifts irrevocable, made clear that gifts perfected
before the effective date of the act were not to be affected. The
court properly found that the right to revoke was personal to
the donating spouse and could not be exercised by the curator
without other reason than mere choice. However, in the alterna-
tive, the curator asked to be permitted to revoke under Article
1497, as the donation had been of all the goods of the donor. This
right was said also to be personal to the donor in that it could
not be exercised by anyone after the death of the donor. How-
ever, since the purpose of the article is to prevent the donor
becoming a charge upon the state, the court found that the
curator of the living interdict could exercise the right in her
interest.
Mortis Causa
The well-known principle that a will is not void but reducible
because the testator failed to leave the forced share to those
entitled to it was reiterated in Roach v. Roach.8 Since proof that
the neglected forced heirs had previously received their shares
failed, their proper portions were protected. Jordan v. Filmore9
was again reaffirmed as giving a correct interpretation of Article
1501 when deciding that it is not necessary to label an extra por-
tion in a will to protect the bequest from collation.
The Succession of Babin'0 involved interpretation of the
following clause of decedent's will: "Should Robert A. Hart die
before I do then it is my will that so much of my estate as he
7. 213 La. 914, 35 So. (2d) 853 (1948).
8. 213 La. 746, 35 So. (2d) 597 (1948).
9. 167 La. 725, 120 So. 275 (1929).
10. 213 La. 950, 35 So. (2d) 864 (1948).
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would have otherwise taken under this will shall belong to and
I hereby give and bequeath the same to his heirs.""
The uncle, residuary legatee under this will, died before
the testatrix leaving nieces and nephews, including the testatrix.
The executor of Mrs. Babin's estate proposed to divide the legacy
by heads among the surviving heirs of the predeceased uncle
and apportion the inheritance tax accordingly. Opponents
thought the division should be by roots and it was so held. The
court reasoned that the rights in the residuum were to be fixed
as of the date of testatrix' death, not that of her uncle and that
distribution should be made to the heirs of the uncle in the
same manner as though he had died after her, transmitting his
right under the will as one of the items of his succession.
The will in question in Succession of Smart 2 was found to
be a valid olographic will though three special bequests were
found to be prohibited under Article 1520 and hence void. One
attempted legacy was found meaningless. A penciled line was
of doubtful origin and if considered not to be in the hand of
the testatrix must be regarded as not having been written under:
Article 1589.
In Succession of Carre"s the supreme court decided that the
constitutional amendment of 1944 relative to adoption 14 did not
have the effect of giving an adopted child the same rights as a
legitimate child and hence an adoption did not revoke a will of
the adopting mother made prior to the adoption." Legislation
of 1948 affecting this subject has been reviewed in the fall issue
of this journal' 6 and will not be repeated here.
COMMUNITY PROPERTY
The opinion by Justice Hawthorne in Succession of Geagan7
is one of the most interesting and forward looking expressions
with regard to community settlements that has appeared in
recent years. In a contest between the widow and a son by a
former marriage of the deceased several items were in dispute.
The general approach by counsel for the widow was that the
deceased husband had tried to defraud her, the second wife, by
placing community property beyond her reach. The facts seem
11. 35 So. (2d) 864, 865.
12. 36 So. (2d) 639 (La. 1948).
13. 212 La. 839, 33 So. (2d) 655 (1948).
14. La. Const. of 1921, Art. IV, § 16.
15. See Art. 1705, La. Civil Code of 1870.
16. Louisiana Legislation of 1948 (1948) 9 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw 18, 24.
17. 212 La. 574, 33 So. (2d) 118 (1947).
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to bear this plea out but a careful analysis had to be made to
ascertain what the husband might do legally, whatever his
motive, and what transactions by him were prohibited. Two
purchases of United States government bonds were in question,
both during the existence of the second community. The first
purchase was soon after the second marriage and counsel pleaded
that these bonds must have been purchased with deceased's
separate funds as he did not have community funds at that time
of sufficient amount to cover. The court found this "negative
proof"'18 insufficient to overcome the presumption of community.
Ownership of the bonds under the federal law remained in the
beneficiary, the son, but the court in awarding the widow judg-
ment against the son, individually, for one-half the value of the
bonds at the death of the husband made the following observa-
tion:
"... we will not permit William J. Geagan, Sr. to do by con-
tract with the Federal government what he could not have
done by donation mortis causa in this state, that is, dispose
of his wife's share of the community property at his death
in favor of a third person."'19
The second purchase of bonds and certain shares of stock
were donated to the son and the court found these donations
invalid. The observation of the court in this connection is set
forth:
"In our opinion the wife should not have to prove fraud
and injury in order to set aside gratuitous dispositions of
valuable movable property. In modern times, when movable
property may and often does constitute the great bulk of
the wealth, the husband should have no more right to dis-
pose of movables gratuitously without the consent of his
wife than he has to dispose of immovables. It appears to
be a matter of sufficient importance to warrant the Legis-
lature's giving this provision of our law serious considera-
tion., 20
The justice pointed out that not every donation of movables
would be invalid nor every donation in this specific proportion
but that the "overall picture indicated disposition to injure the
wife."
18. 212 La. 574, 586, 33 So. (2d) 118, 122.
19. Ibid.
20. 212 La. 574, 599, 33 So. (2d) 118, 126.
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It was found that the corporation organized by the husband
was valid and had not injured the wife, as the community assets
were in existence as shares of stock at fair value in exchange for
the investment. Hence, purchases of property by the corpora-
tion were valid. The claim of the widow for salary from the cor-
poration for services by the husband was allowed to the credit of
the community. The son claimed that the community owed the
husband's separate estate the amount which would bring the
separate estate's value to the figure which it was when the com-
munity began. The court said:
"The evidence in the record does not satisfactorily estab-
lish that the decedent had a separate estate valued at $41,-
000.00, but, assuming that this is true and that it was the
only proof relied upon, we know of no law, nor have counsel
cited any, to the effect that at the dissolution of the commu-
nity it owes each separate estate the value of whatever prop-
erty the spouse had at the time of the marriage."'21
A wife while living separate and apart from her husband,
acquired certain property. She subsequently acquired a divorce
from her husband and later contracted to sell the property. She
brought suit in Johnson v. Johnson22 to force performance of the
contract to sell. The defendant had refused to take title because
the property had been acquired during the community and the
husband was not a party to the subsequent sale nor had the prop-
erty been declared the separate property of the wife in a judicial
settlement between husband and wife. The court found in favor
of the defendant and even admitting arguendo the presumption
that the property bought by the wife while living apart from
her husband was her separate property, the defendant was not
bound to take a "presumptive title.' '23 Disclaimer of title by the
husband was entered after a reasonable -time had elapsed so the
suit for specific performance failed.
A husband acquired during marriage a piece of land by a
dation en paiement in cancellation of a debt owed him prior t
his marriage. The husband in Slaton v. King24 sued his divorced
wife for slander of title to this property which he maintained
was his separate property, as she had granted a mineral lease
upon an undivided one-half of it as she maintained that it was
21. 212 La. 574, 603, 33 So. (2d) 118, 128.
22. 36 So. (2d) 396 (La. 1948).
23. 36 So. (2d) 396, 399.
24. 36 So. (2d) 648 (La. 1948).
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a part of the community previously existing between her and
the plaintiff. The court held the property to have been com-
munity property as title to it was acquired during the community
with no recitations that it was separate property of the husband
acquired for his separate benefit with his separate funds. The
court likened the giving in payment to a sale-not an exchange,
the exception to the general rule. Cases dealing with separate
property of the wife were of course, distinguished. The wife's
recitation in her petition for divorce, that there was no com-
munity property, did not estop her, as plaintiff had not been
misled or damaged by her statement.
For the second time the Succession of Ratcliff25 reached the
supreme court. The appeal was from the final account of the
executors, "which contained the basis for settlement of the com-
munity estate." Mrs. Ratcliff had been charged with her per-
centage, 5.82, of the administration of the entire estate, separate
and community, of the deceased husband and with the same
percentage of the federal estate tax. Her position was that she,
or more accurately, the community, of which she was to receive
one-half was the creditor of the separate estate of the husband
and as such, should not have been charged with these items.
The only accumulation of the community was the income from
the separate property of the husband which vested under the law
in the community as it accrued. Hence, there was no debt from
the separate estate to the community, or to the widow. On the
tax matter, counsel of the widow urged that it was inequitable
for her to pay a large sum at a rate due to the size of the sepa-
rate estate of which she would receive nothing. It was pleaded
that she should pay at the rate levelled upon the community
only. It was not suggested where the difference would come
from in cases which might occur when the tax upon the separate
estate plus the tax on community estate would not be as large
as would the tax on the whole, which is the government's de-
mand. The court very properly noted that the tax is demanded
upon the whole, regardless of Whether separate and community
estates vary materially in size, and refused to change the distri-
bution of the executor. It was further urged that since the
widow was indebted to the community, she, as owner of half,
should only be charged with half. The court reviewed the items
of inventory wherein her indebtedness had been listed as an asset
and agreed with the executor that since she had been credited
with one-half already, she should now pay the whole.
25. 212 La. 563, 33 So. (2d) 114 (1947).
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The plaintiff in Ortego v. Morein2 6 was sole heir of his de-
ceased father and was attempting to recover an undivided in-
terest in a tract of land sold by his mother and in the hands of
defendant. His claim was that the interest was community prop-
erty and he advanced as proof instruments of acquisition indi-
cating a credit deed during the community. It was clearly showr
that these documents were confected in connection with the par-
tition of the successions of his maternal grandparents, hence the
property was clearly the separate property of his mother to
which she had given good title.
In Trahan v. Breaux27 plaintiff sought to recover $5,000.00
in damages for the "embarrassment, humiliation and mental
anguish suffered by his wife" when he was falsely arrested in
her presence by an officer without a warrant for a misdemeanor
committed out of the officer's presence. The court stated that
such damages would be the separate property of the wife under
Article 2402 of the Revised Civil Code and could be recovered by
the wife, alone. This statement of the rule seems clear and
accurate though in previous cases the husband has been per-
mitted to sue for his wife or jointly with his wife.28
In Janney v. Calmes29 the sole issue was whether the suit
was properly dismissed in the lower court on ground of "equitable
and judicial estoppel." In accord Iwith established jurisprudence
the supreme court found that the plea of equitable estoppel was
invalid because reliance had not been placed on the actions and
no detriment had been suffered. The plea of judicial estoppel
was also ineffective as the judicial confession was made in
another suit. These exceptions were overruled and the case
remanded.
Plaintiff, a partner in secret concubinage attempted in Heat-
wole v. Stansbury8N to recover one-half of a homestead savings
account, appearing after several transfers, in the name of the
other partner. An agreement to pool earnings and jointly owned
savings was pleaded. Since the alleged agreement was oral,
it did not meet the legal necessities for a universal partnership.8 1
No community of acquets and gains could be established because
26. 212 La. 774, 33 So. (2d) 516 (1947).
27. 212 La. 459, 32 So. (2d) 845 (1947).
28. See Daggett, The Community Property System of Louisiana (1945)
33 and cases cited.
29. 212 La. 756, 33 So. (2d) 510 (1947).
30. 212 La. 685, 33 So. (2d) 196 (1947).
31. See Art. 2834, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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of the illicit relationship since there was no marriage and no
putative marriage. The court stated that while concubines may
assert legal claims arising out of business transaction between
them, "strict and conclusive proof" 2 must be established which
was lacking to support plaintiff's plea.
In Cotton v. Wright88 the court pointed out that a judgment
for separation of bed and board dissolves the community which
is not reconstituted upon reconciliation of the spouses unless
the spouses reestablish it by notarial act under Act 200 of 1944
amending Article 155 of the Revised Civil Code.
The court held in Parker, Seale & Kelton v. Messina 4 that
when a suit by a wife for separation of bed and board is unsuc-
cessful and the community of course is not dissolved, the attorney
for the wife has a cause of action against the husband, head of
the community, for fees upon a quantum merit basis, as the obli-




The court held in Ober v. Williams' that a conditional prom-
ise to sell did not have the effect of a sale even after the condi-
tions were performed by the prospective buyer nor until the
deed translative of title was passed. Neither did the eventual
sale have retrospective effect. Thus, the mineral servitude in-
volved was not created until the title was transferred and pre-
scription did not begin to run until that date.
Public policy was urged against the decision and fears ex-
pressed that minerals would be held in this fashion by contracts
to sell. The court stated that if and when the contract was used
for this purpose, it would be dealt with.
The effect of an acknowledgment was at issue in James v.
Noble.2 The intent and purpose of the paper was clearly to inter-
rupt prescription against a mineral servitude. Since minors were
holding the servitude, counsel for the plaintiff, landowner, and
maker of the acknowledgment pleaded that the acknowledgment
32. 212 La. 685, 689, 33 So. (2d) 196, 197 (1947).
33. 36 So. (2d) 713 (La. 1948).
34. 36 So. (2d) 724 (La. 1948).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 213 La. 568, 35 So. (2d) 219 (1948).
2. 36 So.(2d) 722 (La. 1948).
